

Comrades of the Conqueror:

*Myths and Realities of the German-Soviet Friendship in the
German Democratic Republic*



Figure 1: “The Obligatory Brother Kiss” between Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev (left) and East German Party Secretary Erich Honecker (right) on the 30th anniversary of the German Democratic Republic’s founding.

Justin Schafer

Undergraduate Research Thesis, December 2010

Presented to the International Studies Program, College of Liberal Arts

California State University, Long Beach; Advisor Dr. Julie Weise

I. Introduction

The lure of conquest is as old as history itself. Indeed, much of mankind's record is replete with wars in which two or more sides face off in a bloody struggle for dominance. Thereafter, two distinct groups arise: the conqueror and the conquered. However, the story of what becomes of the latter after the dust has settled is often forgotten. Yet within these one can witness the most dynamic transformations in how the vanquished both perceive and comport themselves with others. Such narratives of empire have played out countless times over the past millennia and vary greatly in scope, magnitude, and context. From the "firm, benevolent foreign rule" of the British to create an "improved" India, to the United States' present effort to "win hearts and minds" in Afghanistan, our predecessors impart valuable lessons about what different methods of occupation and subjugation yielded, and continue to yield, in the attitudes and actions of the defeated.¹

The relationship between the German Democratic Republic (GDR), an entity which arose out of the Soviet Occupation Zone following the Allies' victory in the Second World War, and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) provide a unique example of one victor's attempt to expand its sphere of influence on a foundation of occupation. Despite years of bitter conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union that left both lands ravaged, the increasing belligerence of Cold War rhetoric between the United States and USSR necessitated the formation of new bonds in order to rebuild war-torn Europe, realign political alliances, and restart a new life in a radically different postwar environment. To accomplish such daunting tasks, the Soviet Union had to take innovative and unprecedented measures.

Unlike conventional forms of imperialism, in which a highly developed triumphant power subjugates, enslaves, or even exterminates their weaker, nonindustrial enemy, this instance proved different. The Soviet Union, an historically agricultural power with an inferiority complex "rooted in the country's miserable living standards, in the peasant origins of many officials, in shame at the brutality of Stalinism, and in

¹Marshall, P. (2009, October 15). *The British Presence in India in the 18th Century*. Retrieved November 11, 2010, from BBC British History In-Depth: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/east_india_01.shtml; Rhem, K. T. (2002, October 17). *Civil Affairs: Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan*. Retrieved October 7, 2010, from American Forces Press Service: <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42605>

embarrassment at the preposterous rituals of an ideologized society,” had emerged the champion.² To suppress Nazi Germany, a heavily industrialized country saturated in over a decade of national-socialist propaganda, the Soviets framed their approach in an unorthodox manner. Instead of focusing on purely political and economic activities, they turned their attention to what postcolonial theorist Edward Said called “the privileged role of culture in the modern imperial experience.”³ Rather than explicitly suppressing the people, they helped to found a government ostensibly administered and operated by German citizens and built up an organizational apparatus to foster sympathy for and goodwill towards themselves, the foreign occupiers. Designated the Society for German-Soviet Friendship (*Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft*; DSF), this organization would come to boast over a third of the country’s total population at its apex, and, in tandem with other components of the Soviet occupation, sought to fundamentally reconstruct the East German collective consciousness.⁴ The establishment of a compulsory membership organization to both subdue a bitter foe and foster a spirit of international goodwill through contrived solidarity is singular in contemporary history. But while the group aimed to confer a societal appreciation for Soviet culture to the people of the GDR, it only achieved superficial success. Despite its efforts, German-Soviet “friendship” remained nominal and only a legacy of apathy, if not contempt, lingered for those who grew up in the shadow of the Soviet Union.

This paper will examine the conditions in East Germany immediately following the Second World War and track how the Soviets adapted their strategy to the period’s changing political and cultural circumstances. It will analyze the tools and methods utilized by the Soviet Union to manipulate the GDR’s social and political landscape within the framework of international communism. Finally, it will evaluate their success by examining contemporary opinions on the DSF, and assess the overall Soviet strategy of cultural imperialism in the never-ending quest to bridge the divide between occupier and occupied.

² Fleron, F. J., Hoffmann, E. P., & Laird, R. F. (2006). *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1991*. Transaction Publishers.

³ Said, E. W. (1994). *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books.

⁴ Kröhnert, S. (2010, September). *Demographic Development in East Germany*. Retrieved November 4, 2010, from Berlin Institute for Population and Development: <http://www.berlin-institut.org/online-handbookdemography/east-germany.html>

II. From Revenge to Revival: German-Soviet Relations in the Postwar Period

Following four years of brutal warfare between National-Socialist Germany and the USSR under its notorious leader, Josef Stalin, relations between the peoples were in shambles and little remained apart from deep-rooted malice. A surprise invasion and protracted siege by the Nazis had brought the Soviet Union's losses to 27 million people – nearly a sixth of its total prewar population – and the country stood teetering on the edge of ruin.⁵ Countless wartime atrocities at the hands of both powers had left an indelible mark on the collective conscience of all involved.

The march into Berlin forced the victorious Soviets to face up to harsh realities previously unbeknownst to them. In her book *Liberation? The East Germans and 1945*, Cold War scholar Silke Satjukov succinctly captures the impression of many in the triumphant Red Army as they advanced into the German capital:

The superiority of communism, unceasingly preached through Marxist-Leninist propaganda, was suddenly called into question by the confrontation with the West: The proud victors of the war abruptly saw themselves as the losers of the saga. The close-up view of the relatively 'good' living conditions of the Germans, despite all the devastation and hardship, set the occupiers in a state of shock that resulted in an overstated show of force, brought about by a desire to compensate for the perceived insults upon entering.⁶

This mindset of vengeance, not only for the wrongdoings that the Nazis had perpetrated against them but also as a release of internal resentment for a repressive home government, led many of the Soviet troops to take part in equally ruthless acts of cruelty as their fascist counterparts had just months before. Under the initial Soviet occupation of East Germany, sexual assault, plunder, and murder became a part of everyday life both leading up to and just after the war's end. Rape in Berlin was so commonplace that it became a "collective experience" for the city's women and men alike.⁷ From prepubescent girls to the elderly, none were spared the horrors of the Red Army's sexual depravity, and the men and boys of the city could do little more than look on in emasculated shame. Resistance demonstrated its futility and nearly always meant death. One Berlin resident described the attempted counteraction of his neighbor in a letter: "The thirteen-year-old

⁵ Loth, W. (1998). *Stalin's Unwanted Child*. (R. F. Hogg, Trans.) New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1.

⁶ Ibid, 8. [Unless otherwise noted, all translations are the work of the author]

⁷ Beevor, A. (2003). *The Fall of Berlin 1945*. New York: Penguin Books, 411.

Dieter Sahl threw himself with flailing fists at a Russian who was raping his mother in front of him. He did not succeed in anything except getting himself shot.”⁸ Doctors estimated that of the approximately two million women raped, many of whom suffered multiple rape, at least ten percent committed suicide thereafter. Abortions subsequently soared, and those who did give birth often abandoned the children at the hospital for fear of their husband’s or fiancé’s rejection.⁹ Shame, revulsion, and despair permeated the East German mind.

The Soviets, in defense of their viciously hedonistic caprice, justified these actions by invoking the Third Reich’s 1941 initial invasion of the USSR and stating that “all later misconducts and crimes on the part of the warring states were founded on this ‘original sin’ and should be thereby nullified.”¹⁰ With arbitrary carte blanche in hand, the Red Army moved into the territory of their decimated foe. Consequently, hatred on both sides deepened due to the grave injustices committed by their respective trespassers.

In the months and years to follow, however, these manifestations of animosity began to wane and the occupying powers turned to the question of Germany’s future. Stalin, fearful of a German resurgence, opted “for every possible and impossible measure to suppress Germany” and believed the best way of doing so was to economically castrate the former enemy, issuing a directive to “steal as much as you can” in early 1945.¹¹ The German industrial infrastructure, once the envy of the world, was dismantled and shipped back to the Soviet Union. Initially, Stalin viewed a unified Germany, albeit militarily



Figure 2: An event to celebrate the birthday of Josef Stalin in Leipzig. Script on the wall reads: “J.W. Stalin – The best friend and helper of the German people.”

⁸ Ibid, 412.

⁹ Ibid, 412.

¹⁰ Satjukow, S. (2009). *Befreiung? Die Ostdeutschen und 1945 [Liberation? The East Germans and 1945]*. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag [Leipzig University Press], 7.

¹¹ Loth, *Stalin's Unwanted Child*, 2-6.

weakened, politically neutral, and economically agrarian, as the best means of securing peace in Europe. Rather than try to establish Soviet-style socialism in the “ideologically unready” Germany, the goal became an “anti-fascist bourgeois democratic government.”¹² Stalin’s pursuit of one state solution proved unsuccessful; the Western Allies refused to concede to his demands and resolved to remain in their side of the country. The Soviet leader resigned himself to a reality that he had altogether hoped to avoid: “The West will adopt West Germany, and we will create our own state in East Germany.”¹³ Only five months after the founding of the Federal Republic of German (*Bundesrepublik Deutschland*) in the Western Occupation Zone, the GDR came into being in October 1949 and finalized Germany’s forty year division.¹⁴

The forging of a state system rooted in the Soviet model first necessitated a unified party apparatus to steer the government and control the populace. To create such an entity, two parties, the Social Democratic Party (*Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands*) and the Communist Party of Germany (*Kommunistische Partei Deutschlands*), joined ranks to form the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands; SED).¹⁵ By its inclusion of the Social Democrats, Germany’s oldest political party, the SED functioned under the guise of a popularly elected coalition. But despite its appearance, only the might of “Soviet bayonets” enabled the SED to hold on to power.¹⁶ With little more than force of arms as its initial backing, the SED’s legitimacy accordingly sank to that of puppet government. Rather than a democratically chosen agent of just rule, it operated as the right arm of Soviet interests in the GDR. Nevertheless, the occupation force had laid the necessary footing for developing a long-lasting, though inequitable, partnership between the two countries.

¹² Ibid, 13.

¹³ Djilas, Milovan, as cited in Loth, *Stalin's Unwanted Child*, 71.

¹⁴ *Germany*. (2010). Retrieved December 7, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/231186/Germany>

¹⁵ *Germany: The Era of Partition*. (2010). Retrieved October 17, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/231186/Germany/58213/The-era-of-partition?anchor=ref297736>

¹⁶ Von Sven, F. K. (2008, February 7). "Es lebe die Freundschaft zwischen den Völkern"; Die Berliner Ausstellung "Unsere Russen, unsere Deutschen" beschäftigt sich mit einem schwierigen Verhältnis [Long live the friendship between the nations'; the Berlin Exhibit 'Our Russians, our Germans'. *Die Welt [The World]*.

III. Constructing Camaraderie: Origins of the ‘Friendship’

While the creation of a political party in the likeness of the Soviets was a first step towards peace and fellowship, the particular difficulties of the East German situation demanded additional measures to win over ordinary German citizens. A visit to the Soviet Occupation Zone by Stalin’s pre-appointed and Soviet-trained SED leaders, at that time charged with the task of implementing the ‘process of forced Sovietization’ in the desolated land, determined the propaganda campaign to be a weak point of their policies and set about reinvigorating their efforts. To this end, the occupiers opened the “House of Culture of the Soviet Union” in Berlin to encourage Soviet cultural appreciation among East Germany’s academics, students, and decision-makers.¹⁷ Shortly thereafter, several “Societies for the Study of the Culture of the Soviet Union” (*Gesellschaften zum Studium der Kultur der Sowjetunion*) arose, initially enjoying ostensible independence from one another but later consolidated into a central structure with headquarters in the East German capital.¹⁸ Present at the first meeting were officers of the Soviet Military Administration in Germany (*Sowjetische Militäradministration in Deutschland*), whose stated purposes were to “broaden the Soviet Union discourse, mobilize the people, and alter [East German] opinions.”¹⁹ And so from its outset, the society focused its energy upon one essential yet exceedingly difficult task: the restructuring of the East German mind.

The difficulty of the undertaking notwithstanding, the SED leadership, in league with their Soviet overseers, pressed on with their campaign of societal recalibration. Simultaneously, the rhetoric of the Cold War was turning increasingly hostile and the Soviets’ need to create a strong ally in East Germany became a top priority.²⁰ The Politburo thus decided to broaden the societies’ role from independent cultural

¹⁷ Behrends, J. C. (2006). *Die erfundene Freundschaft: Propoganda für die Sowjetunion in Polen und in der DDR [The Invented Friendship: Propoganda for the Soviet Union in Poland and the GDR]*. Cologne: Böhlau Verlag GmbH & Cie, 150.

¹⁸ Kuhn, K. (2002). *“Wer mit der Sowjetunion verbunden ist, gehört zu den Siegern der Geschichte...“: Die Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft im Spannungsfeld von Ostberlin und Moskau*. Mannheim: Fakultät für Politische Wissenschaften an der Universität Mannheim, 54.

¹⁹ Behrends. *Die erfundene Freundschaft: Propoganda für die Sowjetunion in Polen und in der DDR*, 151.

²⁰ Kuhn. *“Wer mit der Sowjetunion verbunden ist, gehört zu den Siegern der Geschichte...“*, 62

associations to a mass organization with an explicitly political agenda.²¹ It assigned the newly formed DSF with the following principal tasks:

- 1.) Organization of the fight against anti-bolshevist agitation and imperialist warmongers;
- 2.) Improvement of the relationship of the German population in the Soviet Occupation Zone to the occupying power;
- 3.) Extension of mass propaganda campaign about the successes of the Soviet Union in the fields of literature and art through lectures, films, and appropriate writings;
- 4.) Intensification of work in the industries with the goal of bringing new and larger groups of workers into the Society;
- 5.) Continual updating of the Society's presentations [so that] the lectures comment on the newly emerging questions of the day in the context of the Soviet Union to a far greater degree than before.²²

More than for the study of cultural works, they designed the society as a rigidly structured organization with deliberately manipulative motives. The Soviets hoped to use it as an implement of imperial ambition, inserting itself into every aspect of East German life and combating all forms of anti-Soviet, anti-communist opinion, current and future. Beyond a simple attempt to forge favor between the two nations, it endeavored to monopolize the political discourse and lull the citizenry into a state of not mere complacency, but genuine enthusiasm for a future of Soviet hegemony. But bringing such lofty goals to fruition would require more than a simple propaganda campaign; it would demand a concerted effort utilizing all available means to build artificial understanding on a platform of antipathy.

IV. Manufacturing a Myth: Narratives of the DSF

From its very inception, the destiny of the GDR was inextricably tied to that of the German-Soviet relationship. According to this version of history, the GDR's professed sovereignty and independence would never have been possible without the direct intervention of the Soviets. The GDR's first president, Wilhelm Pieck, affirmed this in his inaugural speech just days after the socialist republic's founding:

The Soviet Union has granted the German people great and inestimable aid in all the years that followed the defeat of the Hitler power...Now it gives us the chance, nationally, to develop a foreign policy of our own and prove our will to democratic and peaceful cooperation with the other nations. The events of the past days have made it clear to all honest Germans that only a policy of sincere

²¹ Naimark, N. M. (1995). *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949*. Cambridge: Belknap Press, 416.

²² Behrends. *Die erfundene Freundschaft: Propoganda für die Sowjetunion in Polen und in der DDR*, 158.

friendship with the Soviet Union can guarantee the unity and freedom of Germany, peace, and the economic and cultural upsurge of the German people...²³

Pieck recognized that the GDR's continued survival was contingent upon a strong alliance with the USSR. But in order for the Soviets to lay the groundwork for this new friendship with East Germany, they had to first gain the trust of the GDR's population by convincing them of their shared resistance against the "imperialist warmongers" in the West. Furthermore, the occupiers needed to assure East Germans of both Soviet munificence and the supremacy of a centrally-planned economic system.

To further promote this narrative and bolster the credibility of their assertions, the occupiers solicited the input of respected German citizens. This came in part from noted scholar and economist Jürgen Kuczynski, who acted as the DSF's first president.²⁴ In characterizing the Soviet Union, Kuczynski stated, "It is the society for which Germany's greatest sons, Marx and Engels, had worked, and which Lenin and Stalin created. It is the culture of the most forward-looking thoughts and the noblest feelings. The Soviet Union is all of this and much, much more."²⁵ But mere admiration for Bolshevism was not enough to weave the intricate tapestry of friendship; the East Germans needed to undergo a fundamental change of heart.



Figure 3: A propaganda poster for the Month of German-Soviet Friendship (*Monat der deutsch-sowjetischen Freundschaft*) from 1952.

To effect such drastic change, the conquerors crafted the powerful story of Soviet "liberation" of Germany from the sinister, despotic oppression of fascist tyranny. Though Hitler's war of aggression had devastated the Soviet Union, the Soviets, according to the Deputy Mayor of East

Berlin Josef Orlopp, "did not retaliate or take

vengeance" upon entering Germany, but instead showed mercy. "At that time the Soviet occupation power

²³ *Yesterday and Today: Contemporaries Report on the Progress of German-Soviet Friendship*. (1967). Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild; Publishing House of the Novosti Press Agency, 133.

²⁴ Childs, D. (1997, August 13). *Obituary: Professor Jürgen Kuczynski*. Retrieved November 2, 2010, from The Independent: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-professor-jurgen-kuczynski-1245205.html>

²⁵ *Ibid*, 163.

need only have left Berlin to its fate for but a few days, and our population would have starved,” Orlopp claimed, “At that time, in the greatest need, the firm foundations of indestructible German-Soviet friendship were created. From that time on our Soviet friends helped us build a new life.”²⁶ For these and a myriad of other altruistic acts, East Germans expressed not only admiration and gratitude, but also indebtedness for the merciful beneficence that their “liberators” had shown them. In the East German version of history, the country’s salvation and resurrection were entirely a result of the Soviet Union, and therefore the fates of the two powers were irretrievably woven together for time eternal. This was memorialized in word and deed and, thanks to the robust propagandizing of the friendship society, served as an ever-present reminder of the GDR’s obligation to the Soviet Union.



Figure 4: A public advertisement in Leipzig for the DSF that reads: “Help everyone to achieve peace; the Soviet Union is the best friend of the German people.”

This great obligation to the occupiers became a central theme in the German-Soviet friendship and a matter of unforgettable importance to those who shaped the fledgling republic’s culture. Few captured its meaning as eloquently and passionately as Stephan Hermlin, one of the GDR’s most well-known writers.²⁷ In a speech at the 3rd Writers’ Congress in East Berlin, Hermlin recalled the Soviets’ splendid selflessness he had witnessed just after the war’s end. He spoke initially of the foodstuffs and equipment that the occupiers distributed in “newly freed Berlin,” emphasizing the paramount importance of their material contributions to the continued survival of the city’s population.²⁸ But he then turned his attention to the greater role of the Soviet Union in putting Germany back on its feet, anthropomorphizing the socialist power with childlike admiration and ascribing almost messianic features to the occupying power:

²⁶ *Yesterday and Today: Contemporaries Report on the Progress of German-Soviet Friendship*, 102-104.

²⁷ Mach, W. (2010, November 1). *Internetseite über den Dichter Stephan Hermlin [Internet Site about the Poet Stephan Hermlin]*. Retrieved November 3, 2010, from Stephan Hermlin: <http://www.hermlin.de/>

²⁸ Hermlin, S. (1952). In C. Gansel, *Erinnerung als Aufgabe?: Dokumentation des II. und III. Schriftstellerkongresses in der DDR 1950 und 1952 [Memory as Duty? Documentation of the 2nd and 3rd Writers’ Congresses in the GDR 1950 and 1952]* (pp. 312-313). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

From my own personal experience, I can say that the Soviet Union gave me my entire country, but also that which I am or could be...It encouraged the Germans and helped them, and what was it that it said? It said unceasingly and with a thousand acts and words: 'Stand upright! Do you not see who you are? Do you not feel how much you owe it to your past, to your great dreamers of yore, to whom we listen, whom we love, and how much you owe it to your future? You could be a wonderful nation, you are already if you so desire it!'...The Soviet Union spoke further, unflinchingly, confidently, smilingly, calmly – it spoke with the voice of Stalin, with the voices of writers, women, Stakhanovites,²⁹ scholars, soldiers, and officers of the occupying power. And ever more Germans stood upright, for the first time in their lives really upright, and went forwards...We owe the Soviet Union great strength and humility, a deeper self-confidence, and a new feeling of responsibility to other nations, greater security, knowledge, [and] patriotism...³⁰

With such a statement, Hermlin appealed to the East Germans' inherent proclivity towards pacifism, all the stronger after the devastation of two wars, and underscored the comfort and security that could be found under the Soviet Union's outstretched wing. His eloquence created a powerful image of the USSR as a concerned, gracious father-figure, not seeking recompense or retaliation for the wickedness carried out against it, but instead issuing mercy and compassion to a wayward child.



Figure 5: Closing ceremonies of the 3rd World Festival in East Berlin. Banner with the image of Soviet Premier Josef Stalin is carried in the background as international youth take part in the celebration.

East German General Secretary Walter

Ulbricht echoed similar sentiments on the 50th anniversary of the October Revolution in 1967.

In his commemorative speech, Ulbricht gave praise to the Soviets, saying: "In 1945 and in the following years, Russian Bolshevik[s] along with their sons and grandsons, Lenin's heirs, helped the German workers, the German people in our part of Germany, to overcome the consequences of fascist barbarism and war, liquidate the rule of the exploiters and war criminals root and branch, and set up the socialist system."³¹ By identifying with the anti-fascist attitudes that ran strong in Germany following the war, Ulbricht characterized

²⁹ Stakhanovites were elite laborers that worked in the manner of Aleksey Stakhanov, a miner who exceeded productivity quotas through innovative work methods. For more information see: *Stakhanovite*. (2010). Retrieved November 2, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/562590/Stakhanovite>

³⁰ Hermlin. *Erinnerung als Aufgabe?: Dokumentation des II. und III. Schriftstellerkongresses in der DDR 1950 und 1952*.

³¹ Ulbricht, W. (1967). *Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union - Lessons of German History*. (Intertext, Trans.) Dresden: Verlag im Bild, 11.

the Soviets as the antithesis of Hitler's totalitarian regime and thus the saviors and true friends of the German people.

These dogmatic portrayals of the Soviets as the liberators, defenders, and preservers of a free and democratic Germany became essential elements of the newly-formed national epic. In a society where, "there was simply no escaping, in an organizational sense, the experience of 'belonging to the community,'" one had little choice but to accept such depictions as truth.³² Since the Soviets and SED party officials literally institutionalized this friendship between the two peoples, it necessarily became an integral part of everyday life in the GDR. But keeping the DSF's narrative alive in the hearts and minds of East Germans would prove to be an even more challenging for the members of the Central Committee and their Soviet overlords.

V. The Cultural Imperialist's Toolbox: Instruments of Shaping Everyday Life

One of the Cold War's most spirited battles was the superpowers' scramble to represent their respective cultures and philosophies to the rest of the world. For the United States, this came in the form of the United States Information Agency's "cultural exchange" policy, which functioned under the assumption "that if [Americans] get to understand the language and culture of other peoples better and other peoples get to understand [America's] better, the world will be a better place in which to live."³³ The Americans outwardly professed that "educational and cultural exchange is and must always be a 'two-way street,'" whether this was true of US foreign policy is debatable.

The Soviets, on the other hand, saw their culture as the paramount expression of societal achievement and "the most visible demonstration of the superiority of Marxism-Leninism and the higher stage of socialism into which the USSR had entered."³⁴ They thus looked to transform East German culture in order to facilitate the construction of socialism on an international scale and friendship therewith. To

³² Fulbrook, M. (1995). *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949-1989*. New York: Oxford University Press, 131.

³³ Spiller, R. E. (1966). American Studies Abroad: Culture and Foreign Policy. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 3.

³⁴ Naimark. *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949*, 398.

generate true solidarity and goodwill among the populace, it was imperative to employ all means of cultural transference.

The DSF itself was, from a practical standpoint, the most effective medium of disseminating the friendship to the masses. To increase participation in the society, the party allowed it access to all areas of daily life, including industries and labor unions.³⁵ As a result, membership grew rapidly, from around 70,000 in March 1949 to nearly one million only a year later.³⁶ The group would eventually claim over 6.5 million members – a staggering number in country with a population of only 16.7 million people – and enjoy a presence throughout East German cities.³⁷ With such a significant proportion of the population taking part, it logically followed that the occupiers should use the mass organization as the umbrella from which to promulgate all forms of propagandistic material to its members, thereby broadening its base and multiplying its means of manipulation.

Yet building a friendship between the countries would entail more than a membership drive. True rapport first required effective communication, embodied in Soviet linguistic policy's "marked tendency to recognize language unity and the cohesiveness of the proletarian society."³⁸ To this end, children in the GDR took obligatory Russian



Figure 6: Taken in May 1958, this image depicts a typical Russian course in the GDR.

³⁵ Ibid, 417.

³⁶ Klingenberg, M. (2001). *Kultur als Vehikel: Zur Geschichte der Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft (1947-1953)* [Culture as a Vehicle: a History of the Society for German Soviet Friendship (1947-1953)]. Heidelberg, 59.

³⁷ Kröhnert. *Demographic Development in East Germany*.

³⁸ Uhlik, M. (2008). Simmering in the Soviet Pot: Language Heterogeneity in Early Soviet Socio-Linguistics. *Studies in East European Thought*, 285-293.

courses beginning in the fifth grade.³⁹ One student from the Soviet Occupation Zone, Willi Grüneberg, remembered the special status of his Russian class as both a required and primary area of study. Beyond mere language acquisition, these courses also functioned as another chance to further reeducate the German youth. Even though the students had previously learned that James Watt had invented the steam-engine and Thomas Edison the light bulb, they had no choice but to listen to their new teacher's bizarre assertions that the Russians were responsible for coming up with both. Grüneberg recalled how, amidst the children's snickering and derision, his teacher "spoke of the earth-shattering achievements of the Soviets, of the high culture, of the groundbreaking innovations that the Soviets would allow us to adopt, as is customary amongst friends."⁴⁰ Not only was the Soviet Union the birthplace of miraculous devices that served mankind, they taught, but they were also willing to share them with their newfound socialist comrades. In this way, political indoctrination became a regular part of basic instruction for East Germany's youth.

But this systemic rehabilitation needed to reach those outside of schools as well. Indeed, much like a child who seeks to gain friends by virtue of his possessions and accomplishments, the Soviets wished for all in the GDR to genuinely admire them for their communist ideals and cultural achievements, including literature, films, cultural performances, and artwork. With this goal in mind, the Soviets undertook an even more vigorous and extensive campaign to forcibly change public opinion.

A primary resource for bringing the German-Soviet Friendship to life was the printed word. Countless books praised the Soviets' work in resurrecting Germany from the ashes of the war, exemplified in such writings as "It Began in Petrograd: Contributions to the 50 Year German-Soviet Friendship." Published in 1967 to celebrate the socialist solidarity that had ostensibly existed in Germany already since the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917, the book begins with the passage: "The history of mankind knows no more meaningful event than the Great Socialist October Revolution" and proceeds to chronicle the shared sentiments of the

³⁹ Böhme, G. (1991). Wandel in der Fremdsprachenpolitik der DDR [Change in the Foreign Language Policies of the GDR]. *International Review of Education*, 168-172.

⁴⁰ Grünberg, W. (2010, October 19). *Russischunterricht in der Besatzungszone [Russian Class in the Occupation Zone]*. Retrieved November 5, 2010, from Spiegel Online: <https://einestages.spiegel.de/external/ShowTopicAlbumBackground/a13521/11/10/F.html#featuredEntry>

German and Soviet people in their common struggles as well as the selflessness of the Red Army in helping to restore and recreate a new Germany. Chapters such as “Preserving Humanity: About the Rescue of Dresden as a City of Art” and “Art Belongs to the People: the Socialist Occupying Power and the Cultural Life of Berlin in the First Years after the War” tell of Soviet magnanimity through their restorative acts in the name of “brotherly friendship.”⁴¹ Moreover, the book’s collective authorship by the *Kulturbund*, another mass organization dedicated to cultural development, demonstrated the apparently universal opinion of society’s thought leaders, which in turn lent greater credence to the effort.

Film, too, played a substantial role in the attempt to convince the Germans of the friendship’s strength. The Soviets saw the role of movies and performing arts as pivotal in “the struggle to reeducate the German people – especially the young – to a true understanding of genuine democracy and humanism...” and thus established the state-owned film studio DEFA (*Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft*) in 1946.⁴² To ensure that their productions reached the masses, the Soviet Military Administration also worked hard to open as many cinemas and theaters as possible in the GDR’s nascent years.⁴³

One DEFA film emblematic of this “struggle” to spread friendship was German-Soviet director Konrad Wolf’s *Sun Seekers* (*Sonnensucher*) from 1958. The plot revolves around the complicated interactions of East German laborers working side by side with their Soviet taskmasters in a uranium mine in the southern GDR. From its beginning, the film recognizes the strained relationship between the occupiers and occupied, however states in the film that “through difficult collective labor, hate and mistrust became friendship in the shafts of Wismut.”⁴⁴ In a memorable monologue, the most respected of the miners, played by famous East German actor Erwin Geschonneck, confidently assuages the doubts of his disenchanted fellow miners:

What is the Soviet Union? The working class rules there and here as well... The Soviet Union is building communism. The Soviet Union is helping the whole world in their struggle for peace, clearly.

⁴¹ Deutscher Kulturbund Berlin [Cultural Association of the GDR - Berlin]. (1967). *Es begann in Petrograd: Beiträge zu 50 Jahre deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft* [It began in Petrograd: Contributions for 50 Years of German-Soviet Friendship]. Berlin: Deutscher Kulturbund [Cultural Association of the GDR], 7.

⁴² Walinski-Kiehl, R. (2006). History, Politics, and East German Film: The Thomas Müntzer (1956) Socialist Epic. *Central European History*, 34.

⁴³ Naimark. *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949*, 419.

⁴⁴ Wolf, K. (Director). (1958). *Sonnensucher* [*Sun Seekers*] [Motion Picture]. Note: Wismut, the German word for the element bismuth, was the name of the joint Soviet-East German mining company from 1947-1990. For more information, see: http://www.wismut.de/index_english.htm.

Soviet might is preventing the Third World War. The Soviet comrades are helping us to build socialism. Us and them, altogether, the workers' power. Peace requires uranium for power plants. Here, in Siberia, in China, everywhere. Don't you see? That's proletarian internationalism! American atomic bombs would have exploded long ago if the Soviet Union didn't have them too. Therefore I say to you, uranium, every hour, uranium!⁴⁵

In this manner, nearly all cultural productions focused on the collaborative construction of communism with the benevolent liberators from the east. For nearly four decades, the DSF spread its message of brotherly friendship, international cooperation, and solidarity in the struggle for a peaceful, socialist utopia, and the ubiquitous phrase "Friendship to the Soviet Union is a matter of the heart for every citizen of the GDR" became little more than a cliché.⁴⁶ For the same period, East German citizens passively took part, if for no other reason than to fulfill their minimal obligations to the state.

VI. The Test of Friendship: DSF in Hindsight

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and subsequent German reunification, the "unbreakable" friendship between the GDR and USSR showed itself to be just the opposite.⁴⁷ Though outright celebration was unthinkable until the removal of Soviet troops was arranged, East Germans could finally express their points of view with candor and without fear of reprisal after so many decades of suppression.⁴⁸ Many felt only contempt for their former "friends," as captured in a 1990 New York Times article examining the feelings of East Germans vis-à-vis the Soviets: "They are not men to be feared any more – but neither are they to be helped...the resentment here in East Germany is still fresh enough to reject any such notion. 'I wouldn't send them a red pfennig,' said a young man."⁴⁹ Though the days of Soviet authoritarianism were in the past, animus towards the former conqueror persisted.

Yet not all memories are so negative. Hartmut Feist, a lifelong resident of the GDR, reflected on the forced friendship with bittersweet sentiment. He recalled with humor the listlessness with which the East

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ DSF - Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft. (2010, January 29). Retrieved November 7, 2010, from Damals im Osten: Mitteldeutschland 1945 - heute [Back then in the East: Central Germany 1945 - today]: <http://www.mdr.de/damals/lexikon/1481281.htm>

⁴⁷ Knabe, H. (2006, March 10). *East Germany Alive and Well*. Retrieved October 8, 2010, from Spiegel Online International: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,440553,00.html>

⁴⁸ Neef, C. (2009, December 29). *Bye-bye, Rote Armee! (Bye-bye, Red Army!)*. Retrieved November 2010, 19, from Der Spiegel: http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/topicalbumbackground/5805/bye_bye_rote_armee.html

⁴⁹ Schmemmann, S. (1990, December 17). Soviet Troops in Germany Become Army of Refugees. *The New York Times*.

Germans had to participate in Soviet celebrations such as Red Army Day, Victory Day, and the Day of the October Revolution, not for political reasons but instead out of concern for their own health: “Before Gorbachev came to power, alcohol at these events flowed in streams, especially vodka, and it severed the friendship if one didn’t keep up...indeed the next day was burdened by serious health problems”⁵⁰ It was neither due to principled political resistance nor entrenched scorn that some East Germans avoided DSF celebrations, but rather out of basic concern for their own health and safety.

Feist further recollected the use of the Soviet troops to do “especially difficult and dirty work” that no German would carry out. As the manager of a state-owned enterprise, he once requested a group of Soviet soldiers to clean out a building so squalid that his other workers had refused to enter. When one of Feist’s schoolteachers from his youth saw the spectacle, he exclaimed, “You can’t allow that! The victors cleaning the filth of the vanquished – that’s never happened before in the history of the world.”⁵¹ Cognizant of the Soviets’ eagerness to appear as equals, the East Germans exploited the occupation for their own benefit. In their determination to portray themselves as fellow members of the global proletariat, the Soviets had turned the conventional occupier-occupied dichotomy on its head.

The existence of very real friendships between individuals, however, cannot be overlooked. Feist goes on to tell of his coworker’s private friendship with a Soviet officer, a rare phenomenon in the GDR. They visited one another’s families and even traveled together, though always in civilian clothes so as not to attract attention. But such kinship between the occupiers and occupied was the exception and not the rule.⁵²

Indeed, despite the rhetoric of “eternal friendship between brothers-in-arms,” fraternization between Germans and Soviets was strictly forbidden by East German and Soviet party officials, who viewed the DSF as “a friendship of institutions, not of people themselves.”⁵³ Representative of this was the Kremlin’s policy

⁵⁰ Feist, H. (2004, September 28). *Die deutsch-sonjetische Freundschaft: eine Herzenssache für jeden DDR-Bürger [The German-Soviet Friendship: a Matter of Heart for Every Citizen of the GDR]*. Retrieved October 10, 2010, from Damals in der DDR [Back then in the GDR]:

<http://www.mdr.de/damals-in-der-ddr/ihre-geschichte/1610312.html>

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Satjukow, S. (2008, April 10). *Der düstere Freund [The Somber Friend]*. Retrieved November 6, 2010, from Die Zeit: <http://www.zeit.de/2008/16/A-Besatzer>

towards marriage between Germans and Soviets, which it viewed as a security risk and thus only allowed them in special cases.⁵⁴ Contrary to their alleged values, the DSF in actuality worked as a buffer to German-Soviet camaraderie rather than the conduit it purported itself to be.

Regardless of such institutional obstacles, however, and perhaps even as a direction challenge to them, authentic relationships did occasionally form. In the end, as Satjukow described, “behind the backs of the dogmatists, Cold Warriors, and paranoid functionaries, space opened for true German-Soviet, German-Russian Friendship: A pledge for the future after all the terrors of the past.”⁵⁵ Upon this pledge, the Germans and Russians finally gained the chance to build genuine, lasting friendship in an environment of mutual respect.

VII. Conclusion

Like all human beings, the central desire of nations is “to be liked for who they think they really are, whether their opinion of themselves is accurate or not.”⁵⁶ Cultural foreign policy is thus the attempt to bring “the national self-image and the opinions of other nations...into closer agreement.”⁵⁷ In the aftermath of war, however, the matter becomes all the more complicated. Occupations are by nature imbalanced; a superior force enjoys a power monopoly and the inferior has no choice but to simply submit to its ruler’s will. Since friendship implies an understanding between equals established on trust, the disparity of occupation renders its existence virtually impossible.

The case of the German-Soviet Friendship remains especially unique in its implementation. Seeking to avoid the militaristic and authoritative associations which the Soviet Union saw as characteristically Western, the Politburo unilaterally built a “prescriptive” bond on little more than empty platitudes and

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ Ibid.

⁵⁶ Spiller. *American Studies Abroad: Culture and Foreign Policy*, 4.

⁵⁷ Ibid, 4.

feigned affinity.⁵⁸ Like the construction of their own political system, the Soviets hierarchically manufactured this comradeship by force of arms rather than letting it form of its own volition. Quite expectedly, truisms and superficialities arose that could never fully mask the deep-seated disdain between the formerly hostile powers. Though in time this antagonism diminished, the roots of real friendship between the states never took hold.

The relationship between conqueror and conquered is intrinsically strained, if not outright violent, and therefore cannot serve as fertile ground upon which to plant the seeds of friendship. The victor's wishes, whether out of self-interest or a legitimate desire to help, invariably trump those of the vanquished and ill will correspondingly develops within the subordinate. No amount of propaganda, irrespective of how well-intentioned or persuasive it may be, can overcome this inherent inequality. Invaders and occupiers must recognize that hostility is a fundamental repercussion of forceful actions; neither inspired rhetoric nor benign deeds can permanently alter such feelings. The failure of Soviet cultural policy in Germany demonstrates once more that the human spirit is, and always shall be, an indomitable force for sovereignty and self-determination.

⁵⁸ Nothnagle, A. (1999). *Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.

Bibliography

- 3rd World Festival International Closing Ceremonies*. (1951). Retrieved November 2010, 20, from Deutsche Fotothek: http://www.deutschefotothek.de/?df_pos-2006-a_0000096&dmode=zoom
- Beevor, A. (2003). *The Fall of Berlin 1945*. New York: Penguin Books.
- Behrends, J. C. (2006). *Die erfundene Freundschaft: Propoganda für die Sowjetunion in Polen und in der DDR [The Invented Friendship: Propoganda for the Soviet Union in Poland and the GDR]*. Cologne: Böhlau Verlag GmbH & Cie.
- Berühmte Küsse und was dahinter steckt [Famous Kisses and What's behind Them]*. (2009, March 17). Retrieved November 15, 2010, from Die Welt Online [The World Online]: <http://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article3391945/Beruehmte-Kuesse-und-was-dahinter-steckt.html?pg=2>
- Böhme, G. (1991). Wandel in der Fremdsprachenpolitik der DDR [Change in the Foreign Language Policies of the GDR]. *International Review of Education* , 168-172.
- Burant, S. R. (1987, July). *A Country Study: Germany, East (Former)*. Retrieved October 6, 2010, from Library of Congress Country Studies: <http://lcweb2.loc.gov/frd/cs/gxtoc.html>
- Childs, D. (1997, August 13). *Obituary: Professor Jurgen Kuczynski*. Retrieved November 2, 2010, from The Independent: <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/people/obituary-professor-jurgen-kuczynski-1245205.html>
- Deutscher Kulturbund Berlin [Cultural Association of the GDR - Berlin]. (1967). *Es begann in Petrograd: Beiträge zu 50 Jahre deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft [It began in Petrograd: Contributions for 50 Years of German-Soviet Friendship]*. Berlin: Deutscher Kulturbund [Cultural Association of the GDR].
- Die großzügige Hilfe der Befreier (The Generous Help of the Liberators)*. (1958, May). Retrieved November 14, 2010, from Der Spiegel: <https://einestages.spiegel.de/external/ShowAuthorAlbumBackground/a13521/11/10/F.html#featuredEntry>
- DSF - *Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft*. (2010, January 29). Retrieved November 7, 2010, from Damals im Osten: Mitteldeutschland 1945 - heute [Back then in the East: Central Germany 1945 - today]: <http://www.mdr.de/damals/lexikon/1481281.html>
- DSF *Advertisement in Leipzig*. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2010, from Deutsche Fotothek: http://www.deutschefotothek.de/?df_roe-neg_0006212_031&dmode=zoom
- Feist, H. (2004, September 28). *Die deutsch-sowjetische Freundschaft: eine Herzenssache für jeden DDR-Bürger [The German-Soviet Friendship: a Matter of Heart for Every Citizen of the GDR]*. Retrieved October 10, 2010, from Damals in der DDR [Back then in the GDR]: <http://www.mdr.de/damals-in-der-ddr/ihre-geschichte/1610312.html>

- Festival for the Celebration of Josef Stalin's Birthday*. (n.d.). Retrieved November 24, 2010, from http://www.deutschefotothek.de/?df_roe-neg_0006021_024&dmode=zoom
- Fleron, F. J., Hoffmann, E. P., & Laird, R. F. (2006). *Soviet Foreign Policy 1917-1991*. Transaction Publishers.
- Fulbrook, M. (1995). *Anatomy of a Dictatorship: Inside the GDR 1949-1989*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Germany*. (2010). Retrieved December 7, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/231186/Germany>
- Germany: The Era of Partition*. (2010). Retrieved October 17, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/231186/Germany/58213/The-era-of-partition?anchor=ref297736>
- Grünberg, W. (2010, October 19). *Russischunterricht in der Besatzungszone [Russian Class in the Occupation Zone]*. Retrieved November 5, 2010, from Spiegel Online: <https://einestages.spiegel.de/external/ShowTopicAlbumBackground/a13521/11/10/F.html#featuredEntry>
- Hartmann, A., & Eggeling, W. (1993). *Die Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft: Analysen [The Society for German-Soviet Friendship: Analyses]*. Berlin: Akademie Verlag [Academy Press].
- Heine, M. (2009, November 13). *DSF ist bald nur noch Geschichte [The DSF is now only history]*. Retrieved October 17, 2010, from Die Welt [The World]: <http://www.welt.de/die-welt/kultur/article5195039/DSF-ist-bald-nur-noch-Geschichte.html>
- Hermlin, S. (1952). In C. Gansel, *Erinnerung als Aufgabe?: Dokumentation des II. und III. Schriftstellerkongresses in der DDR 1950 und 1952 [Memory as Duty? Documentation of the 2nd and 3rd Writers' Congresses in the GDR 1950 and 1952]* (pp. 312-313). Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.
- Institut für Geschichte der Völker der UdSSR an der Martin-Luther Universität Halle. (1965). *Zwei Jahrzehnte deutsch-sowjetische Beziehungen 1945-1965 [Two Decades of German Soviet Relations 1945-1965]*. Berlin: Staatsverlag der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik [State Publisher of the German Democratic Republic].
- Klingenberg, M. (2001). *Kultur als Vehikel: Zur Geschichte der Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft (1947-1953) [Culture as a Vehicle: a History of the Society for German Soviet Friendship (1947-1953)]*. Heidelberg.
- Knabe, H. (2006, March 10). *East Germany Alive and Well*. Retrieved October 8, 2010, from Spiegel Online International: <http://www.spiegel.de/international/spiegel/0,1518,440553,00.html>
- Kröhnert, S. (2010, September). *Demographic Development in East Germany*. Retrieved November 4, 2010, from Berlin Institute for Population and Development: <http://www.berlin-institut.org/online-handbookdemography/east-germany.html>
- Kuhn, K. (2002). *"Wer mit der Sowjetunion verbunden ist, gehört zu den Siegern der Geschichte...": Die Gesellschaft für Deutsch-Sowjetische Freundschaft im Spannungsfeld von Ostberlin und Moskau*. Mannheim: Fakultät für Politische Wissenschaften an der Universität Mannheim.

- Loth, W. (1998). *Stalin's Unwanted Child*. (R. F. Hogg, Trans.) New York: St. Martin's Press, Inc.
- Mach, W. (2010, November 1). *Internetseite über den Dichter Stephan Hermlin [Internet Site about the Poet Stephan Hermlin]*. Retrieved November 3, 2010, from Stephan Hermlin: <http://www.hermlin.de/>
- Marshall, P. (2009, October 15). *The British Presence in India in the 18th Century*. Retrieved November 11, 2010, from BBC British History In-Depth: http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/empire_seapower/east_india_01.shtml
- Monat der deutsch-sonjetischen Freundschaft [Month of German-Soviet Friendship]*. Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin, Germany.
- Naimark, N. M. (1995). *The Russians in Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945-1949*. Cambridge: Belknap Press.
- Neef, C. (2009, December 29). *Bye-bye, Rote Armee! (Bye-bye, Red Army!)*. Retrieved November 2010, 19, from Der Spiegel: http://einestages.spiegel.de/static/topicalbumbackground/5805/bye_bye_rote_armee.html
- Nothnagle, A. (1999). *Building the East German Myth: Historical Mythology and Youth Propaganda in the German Democratic Republic, 1945-1989*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
- Rhem, K. T. (2002, October 17). *Civil Affairs: Winning Hearts and Minds in Afghanistan*. Retrieved October 7, 2010, from American Forces Press Service: <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=42605>
- Said, E. W. (1994). *Culture and Imperialism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Satjukow, S. (2009). *Befreiung? Die Ostdeutschen und 1945 [Liberation? The East Germans and 1945]*. Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag [Leipzig University Press].
- Satjukow, S. (2008, April 10). *Der düstere Freund [The Somber Friend]*. Retrieved November 6, 2010, from Die Zeit: <http://www.zeit.de/2008/16/A-Besitzer>
- Schmemmann, S. (1990, December 17). Soviet Troops in Germany Become Army of Refugees. *The New York Times*.
- Spiller, R. E. (1966). American Studies Abroad: Culture and Foreign Policy. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 1-16.
- Stakhanovite*. (2010). Retrieved November 2, 2010, from Encyclopædia Britannica: <http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/562590/Stakhanovite>
- Uhlik, M. (2008). Simmering in the Soviet Pot: Language Heterogeneity in Early Soviet Socio-Linguistics. *Studies in East European Thought*, 285-293.
- Ulbricht, W. (1967). *Friendship and Alliance with the Soviet Union - Lessons of German History*. (Intertext, Trans.) Dresden: Verlag im Bild.

Von Sven, F. K. (2008, February 7). "Es lebe die Freundschaft zwischen den Völkern"; Die Berliner Ausstellung "Unsere Russen, unsere Deutschen" beschäftigt sich mit einem schwierigen Verhältnis ['Long live the friendship between the nations'; the Berlin Exhibit 'Our Russians, our Germans'. *Die Welt [The World]* .

Walinski-Kiehl, R. (2006). History, Politics, and East German Film: The Thomas Müntzer (1956) Socialist Epic. *Central European History* , 30-55.

Wolf, K. (Director). (1958). *Sonnensucher [Sun Seekers]* [Motion Picture].

Yesterday and Today: Contemporaries Report on the Progress of German-Soviet Friendship. (1967). Dresden: Verlag Zeit im Bild; Publishing House of the Novosti Press Agency.

Image Sources

Figure 1: *Berühmte Küsse und was dahinter steckt [Famous Kisses and What's behind Them]*. (2009, March 17). Retrieved November 15, 2010, from Die Welt Online [The World Online]: <http://www.welt.de/vermischtes/article3391945/Beruehmte-Kuesse-und-was-dahinter-steckt.html?pg=2>

Figure 2: *Festival for the Celebration of Josef Stalin's Birthday*. (n.d.). Retrieved November 24, 2010, from http://www.deutschefotothek.de/?df_roe-neg_0006021_024&dmode=zoom

Figure 3: *Monat der deutsch-sonjetischen Freundschaft [Month of German-Soviet Friendship]*. Deutsches Historisches Museum, Berlin, Germany.

Figure 4: *DSF Advertisement in Leipzig*. (n.d.). Retrieved October 12, 2010, from Deutsche Fotothek: http://www.deutschefotothek.de/?df_roe-neg_0006212_031&dmode=zoom

Figure 5: *3rd World Festival International Closing Ceremonies*. (1951). Retrieved November 2010, 20, from Deutsche Fotothek: http://www.deutschefotothek.de/?df_pos-2006-a_0000096&dmode=zoom

Figure 6: *Die großzügige Hilfe der Befreier (The Generous Help of the Liberators)*. (1958, May). Retrieved November 14, 2010, from Der Spiegel: <https://einestages.spiegel.de/external/ShowAuthorAlbumBackground/a13521/11/10/F.html#featuredEntry>